The NORAD/FAA procedure was changed in June of 2001 and the normal procedures were reinstated on 12 Sept 2001 Effect of Rule Change Air Traffic control Air Controlers... Logan Pete Zalewski ( should have been fired immediately and had a hearing about his "actions" says he followed procedures "I used the Emergency frequency"
What this means is he tried contacting Flight 11 for 11-13 minites
he did not follow SOP his ruthless disregard for procedures that worked successfully for decades was blithly disregarded. Procedure says he should have sent out an "immediated emergency signal" after 3 minutes to all stations and the supervisor is notified as well This did not happen
In fact the supervisor was alerted to the situation by ANOTHER controler(Lino Martins) NOT Zalewski Explaining What Happen From [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 7] 8:20am transponder shut off flight 11 was NORDO for 6 mins..i.e. no radio contact by 8;30 the entire air control system was informed from coast to coast and all points inbetween. On Sept. 11, NORAD wasn't notified until 8:40 a.m. -- six minutes before the plane struck the World Trade CenteFlight 175 8:46 disappears from radar then mins later the "transponder" turns back on
The first “operational evidence” that something is wrong is at 8:47, when Flight 175’s transponder code changes twice within a minute (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001). Pete Zalewski - yup, he gets this one also,
Tough day at the office, huh Pete?
Unconfirmed report that he was involved with another hi-jacking ( Flight 700?) But only one source so far. A Lot of Information September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Transponder Turned Off.(Between 8:13-8:21 a.m.) The flight is now “drastically off course” - NORAD is still not notified. [MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] On Sept. 11, NORAD wasn't notified until 8:40 a.m. -- six minutes before the plane struck the World Trade Center. NORAD says they knew at 8;40 20 minutes after hi-jacking May Day was sent to entire country Pete Zalewski, who is handling Flight 11, says that after the second of these: “I immediately knew something was very wrong. And I knew it was a hijack.” Immediately!!??! ,,, he spent 11-13 minutes trying to raise Flight 11
and broke protocal He alerts no one,
Lino Martins, another Boston air traffic controller, notices and knows the situation, he calls the supervisor attention , “the supervisor came over, and that’s when we realized something was serious.” [Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] However, two senior FAA officials—Bill Peacock and David Canoles—later say that the hijacker transmissions were not attributed to a flight, so controllers don’t know where they have come from. [Washington Times, 9/11/2002] An interview with Robin Hordon " “I was a certified ATC in Boston west-bound departures, the routing that AA11 and UA175 followed on 9/11. I know it like the back of my hand.” Robin Hordon "They lost radio response,what happens next is ,,he handled hi-jacking in the past ("forget the hi-jacking," procedure was broken, normal system response to unexpected event) There is much information in the above one point is that the system is automated Not a single fighter launched until an Hour and 23 mins had passed from "offical"notification The above is not complete , but a base to consider consider... There was no response the people in charge did nothing. The only thing these public servents did was make excuses and tell lies This is the most likely place to start FAA/and all on the path...NORAD etc, Who changed the procedures FAA Standard Intercept Procedures Order 7610.4, Special Military Operations Air Defense Identification Zone. ADLO. Air Defense Liaison Officer. ADMIS (number)
Colin Scoggins He got away with saying this
“I couldn’t get a timeline that made any sense.” He aint the only one
Specifically designated military units, when identified, may provide augmentation for NORAD and function as ADCFs. Air Defense Emergency. A military emergency condition declared by a designated authority. This condition exists when an attack upon the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, or U.S. installations in Greenland by hostile aircraft or missiles is considered probable, is imminent, or is taking place. (Refer to the AIM). "If ... you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency, handle it as though it were an emergency." --FAA Order 7110.65M 10-1-1-c (7) A high-ranking FAA official - called an Air Defense Liaison Officer (ADLO) - is stationed in the headquarters of NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command. The purpose: to help the FAA and the military work together to handle emergencies as quickly as possible. This is the change put in effect in June 2001
"Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action. However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission. " --FAA Order 7610.4J 7-1-2 (9) Members of staff at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) have difficulty locating Flight 11 (The First No Planers ) and other aircraft on their radar screens. Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins of NEADS says that when the FAA first calls and reports the first hijacking (see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001), “He [FAA] gave me the latitude and longitude of that track… [but] there was nothing there.” [Fox News, 9/8/2002] Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, later recalls, “I was giving NEADS accurate location information on at least five instances where AA 11 was, yet they could never identify him.
… I originally gave them an F/R/D, which is a fix/radial/distance from a known location; they could not identify the target. They requested latitude/longitudes, which I gave them; they still could not identify the AA 11.…NORAD has the capacity to inject simulated material, including mass attacks, during exercises, “as though it was being sensed for the first time by a radar site.” [US Department of Defense, 1/14/1999] At least one military exercise this morning is reported to include simulated information injected onto radar screens (see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001). Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, (claims the transponder is turned off some time after 8:30 a.m.
where as the Flight 11 hijack was first detected at 8:20 a.m.) [ABC News, Marr calls Major General Larry Arnold at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base,Florida. Arnold recalls, “I said go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get the authorities later.” Arnold then calls the operations deputy at NORAD’s Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado headquarters to report. The operations deputy tells him, “Yeah, we’ll work this with the National Military Command Center. Go ahead and scramble the aircraft.” [ABC News, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003; Filson, 2004, pp. 56; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Upon receiving this authorization from Larry Arnold, NEADS orders the scramble and then calls Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek at NORAD’s operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, in order to get NORAD commander in chief approval for it (see (8.46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002] Yet, according to the 1st Air Force’s own book about 9/11, the “sector commander [at NEADS] would have authority to scramble the airplanes.” Military controllers at NEADS are only a hot line call away from the pilots on immediate alert. [Filson, 2004, pp. 50-52] Why NEADS calls the CONR headquarters at Tyndall, then NORAD’s Colorado operations center, to get authorization to launch fighters after Flight 11, is unclear. Colonel Marr Flight 175 lost radio contact at 8:42 a.m. (see 8:41 a.m. September 11, 2001) and changed transponder signals at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001); a flight controller declared it possibly hijacked sometime between 8:46 a.m. and 8:53 a.m. (see (Shortly After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001); Note that this response contradicts flight control manager Glenn Michael’s assertion that Flight 11 was considered a possible hijacking as soon as the transponder was discovered turned off. A flight control manager called it hijacked at 8:55 a.m.(see (8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001) This might explain whta the controllers were tracking An early FAA report will similarly refer to them as having come “from an unknown origin.” But right away, the center begins notifying the chain of command that a suspected hijacking is taking place (see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ] However, some reports claim that controllers decided Flight 11 was probably hijacked earlier than this, by about 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001). http://www.wingo.com/opinion/conspiracy911.html Sources http://www.gnosticliberationfront.com/guilty_for_911.htm http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/entity.jsp?entity=glenn_michael http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a813transponder&scale=2#a813transponder http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a813transponder&scale=2#a813transponder The commission has not explained why New York flight control would wait 10-17 minutes before warning NORAD that Flight 175 is possibly hijacked. [9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] It also would not explain why United Airlines headquarters would fail to notify NORAD National Guard after learning that the plane has been hijacked at about 8:50 a.m. (see (8:50 a.m NORAD Timeline Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, claims he makes his first call to NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) regarding Flight at 11 8:35 am Then there is the mystery of United Flight 93.
In the Seattle Times of Sept. 16,
Maj. Gen. Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, is quoted as saying
"[n]o Air National Guard or other military planes were scrambled to chase the fourth hijacked airliner, United Airlines Flight 93." Almost an hour and a half after the first tower was struck.no planes scrambled http://www.nypress.com/14/50/taki/bunker.cfm This directly condridicts Major General Larry Arnold at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base,Florida. Arnold recalls, “I said go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get the authorities later.” Arnold then calls the operations deputy at NORAD’s Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado headquarters to report. The operations deputy tells him, “Yeah, we’ll work this with the National Military Command Center. Go ahead and scramble the aircraft.” This is what we have... the 9/11 Commission is an insult to Investigation. There are too many things left out , unanswered and wrong, We want an open and pubic hearing on the events of 9/11