Let's start at the begining
The NORAD/FAA procedure was changed in June of 2001
and the normal procedures were reinstated on 12 Sept 2001
Effect of Rule Change
Air Traffic control
Air Controlers... Logan
( should have been fired immediately and had a hearing about his "actions"
says followed procedures
"I used the Emergency frequency"
What this means is he try contacting Flight 11 for over 11-13 minites
he did not follow SOP
his ruthless disregard for procedures that have worked successfully for decades was blithly disregarded.
Procedure says he should have sent out an "immediated emergency signal" after 3 minutes to all stations
and the supervisor is notified as well
This did not happen
In fact the supervisor was alertet to the situation by ANOTHER controler(Lino Martins)
Explaining What Happen
From [9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 7]
8:20am transponder shut off flight 11
was NORDO for 6 mins..i.e. no radio contact
by 8;30 the entire air control system was informed
from coast to coast and all points inbetween.
On Sept. 11, NORAD wasn't notified until 8:40 a.m. --
six minutes before the plane struck the World Trade Cente
8:46 disappears from radar
then mins later the "transponder" turns back on
The first “operational evidence” that something is wrong is at 8:47,
when Flight 175’s transponder code changes twice within a minute
(see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001).
A Lot of Information
This is a scalable context timeline. It contains events related to the event
(Between 8:13-8:21 a.m.)
September 11, 2001: Flight 11 Transponder Turned Off.
The flight is now “drastically off course” but NORAD is still not notified.
[MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
On Sept. 11, NORAD wasn't notified until 8:40 a.m. --
six minutes before the plane struck the World Trade Center.
NORAD says they knew at 8;40
20 minutes after hi-jacking May Day was sent to entire country
An interview with Robin Hordon
" “I was a certified ATC in Boston west-bound departures, the routing that AA11 and
UA175 followed on 9/11. I know it like the back of my hand.”
"They lost radio response,what happens next is ,,he handled hi-jacking in the past
("forget the hi-jacking," procedure was broken,
normal system response to unexpected event)
There is much information in the above
one point is that the system is automated
Not a single fighter launched until
an Hour and 23mins had passed from "offical"notification
The above is not complete , but a base to consider
There was no response
the people in charge did nothing.
The only thing these public servents did
was make excuses and tell lies
This is the most likely place to start
FAA/and all on the path...NORAD etc,
Who changed the procedures
FAA Standard Intercept Procedures
Order 7610.4, Special Military Operations
Air Defense Identification Zone. ADLO. Air Defense Liaison Officer. ADMIS (number)
Specifically designated military units, when identified, may provide augmentation for NORAD
and function as ADCFs.
Air Defense Emergency. A military emergency condition declared by a designated authority.
This condition exists when an attack upon the continental United States,
Alaska, Canada, or U.S. installations in Greenland by hostile aircraft or missiles
is considered probable, is imminent, or is taking place. (Refer to the AIM).
"If ... you are in doubt that a situation constitutes an emergency or potential emergency,
handle it as though it were an emergency."
--FAA Order 7110.65M 10-1-1-c (7)
A high-ranking FAA official -
called an Air Defense Liaison Officer (ADLO) -
is stationed in the headquarters of NORAD, the North American Aerospace Defense Command.
The purpose: to help the FAA and the military work together to handle emergencies as quickly as possible.
"Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action.
However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft
assigned to the escort mission. "
--FAA Order 7610.4J 7-1-2 (9)
Pete Zalewski, who is handling Flight 11, says that after the second of these:
“I immediately knew something was very wrong. And I knew it was a hijack.”
He alerts no one,
Lino Martins, another Boston air traffic controller,
notices and knows the situation, he calls the supervisor attention
, “the supervisor came over, and that’s when we realized something was serious.”
[Christian Science Monitor, 9/13/2001; MSNBC, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004]
However, two senior FAA officials—Bill Peacock and David Canoles—later say that the hijacker
transmissions were not attributed to a flight,
so controllers don’t know where they have come from.
[Washington Times, 9/11/2002]
This might explain whta the controllers were tracking
An early FAA report will similarly refer to them as having come “from an unknown origin.”
But right away, the center begins notifying the chain of command that a suspected hijacking is taking place
(see 8:25 a.m. September 11, 2001). [Federal Aviation Administration, 9/17/2001 ]
However, some reports claim that controllers decided Flight 11 was probably hijacked earlier than this,
by about 8:20 a.m. (see (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
NORAD has the capacity to inject simulated material, including mass attacks, during exercises,
“as though it was being sensed for the first time by a radar site.”
[US Department of Defense, 1/14/1999]
At least one military exercise this morning is reported to include simulated information injected onto radar screens
(see (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001).
Members of staff at NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) have difficulty locating Flight 11
and other aircraft on their radar screens.
Lt. Col. Dawne Deskins of NEADS says that when the FAA first calls and reports the first hijacking
(see (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001),
“He [FAA] gave me the latitude and longitude of that track… [but] there was nothing there.” [Fox News, 9/8/2002]
Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, later recalls,
“I was giving NEADS accurate location information on at least five instances where AA 11 was,
yet they could never identify him.… I originally gave them an F/R/D,
which is a fix/radial/distance from a known location;
they could not identify the target.
They requested latitude/longitudes, which I gave them; they still could not identify the AA 11.…
Colonel Robert Marr, head of NEADS, (claims the transponder is turned off some time after 8:30 a.m.
where as the Flight 11 hijack was first detected at 8:20 a.m.) [ABC News,
Major General Larry Arnold at the Continental US NORAD Region (CONR) headquarters at Tyndall Air Force Base,Florida.
“I said go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get the authorities later.”
Arnold then calls the operations deputy at NORAD’s Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado headquarters to report.
The operations deputy tells him, “Yeah, we’ll work this with the National Military Command Center.
Go ahead and scramble
the aircraft.” [ABC News, 9/11/2002; 9/11 Commission, 5/23/2003; Filson, 2004, pp. 56; 9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] Upon receiving this authorization from Larry Arnold, NEADS orders the scramble and then calls Canadian Captain Mike Jellinek at NORAD’s operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, in order to get NORAD commander in chief approval for it (see (8.46 a.m.) September 11, 2001). [Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6/3/2002] Yet, according to the 1st Air Force’s own book about 9/11, the “sector commander [at NEADS] would have authority to scramble the airplanes.” Military controllers at NEADS are only a hot line call away from the pilots on immediate alert. [Filson, 2004, pp. 50-52] Why NEADS calls the CONR headquarters at Tyndall, then NORAD’s Colorado operations center, to get authorization to launch fighters after Flight 11, is unclear.
Flight 175 lost radio contact at 8:42 a.m. (see 8:41 a.m. September 11, 2001)
and changed transponder signals at 8:46 a.m. (see 8:46 a.m.-8:47 a.m. September 11, 2001);
a flight controller declared it possibly hijacked sometime between 8:46 a.m. and 8:53 a.m.
(see (Shortly After 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001);
Note that this response
contradicts flight control manager Glenn Michael’s assertion
that Flight 11 was considered a possible hijacking as soon as the transponder was discovered turned off.
A flight control manager called it hijacked at 8:55 a.m.(see (8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001)
The commission has not explained why New York flight control would wait 10-17 minutes
before warning NORAD that Flight 175 is possibly hijacked.
[9/11 Commission, 6/17/2004] It also would not explain why United Airlines headquarters would fail to notify NORAD
National Guard after learning that the plane has been hijacked at about 8:50 a.m. (see (8:50 a.m
Colin Scoggins, the military liaison at the FAA’s Boston Center, claims he makes his first call
to NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (NEADS) regarding Flight at 11 8:35 am
If you know of Interviews and statement about this subject post them
Then there is the mystery of United Flight 93.
In the Seattle Times of Sept. 16,
Maj. Gen. Paul Weaver, director of the Air National Guard, is quoted as saying that
"[n]o Air National Guard or other military planes were scrambled to chase the fourth hijacked airliner,
United Airlines Flight 93." No military planes were scrambled!
Remember, this plane came crashing down in Pennsylvania almost an hour and a half after the first tower was struck.
There were no planes involved at all I say .
You say I am nuts
I say ,,, we will lay that aside.
I say a combination of weapons including DEW were used on the WTC
you say atomic or thermite or whatever
I say we lay this aside
This is what we have... the 9/11 Commission is an insult to Investigation.
There are too many things left out , unanswered and wrong,
We want an open and pubic hearing on the events of 9/11